摘要
本文研究媒体对政治关联高管行为的监督和约束作用。结果发现,并购绩效越差的公司,高管越容易被变更,但是,政治关联高管即使并购绩效差也较不容易被变更。进一步研究还发现,当媒体对并购事件的负面报道次数较多,或者当公司位于地方媒体监督功能较强的省份时,高管的政治关联背景并不能起到"护身符"的作用,他们并购败绩后被变更概率与非政治关联高管无显著差异。这说明,媒体监督这种非正式外部治理机制可以通过强大的社会舆论力量约束政治关联高管行为,从而提高上市公司治理水平。
One unique feature of Chinese listed companies is that many of their CEOs are politically connected. According to Fan, Wong and Zhang （2007）, 27% of the CEOs in Chinese listed companies serve as current or former government bureaucrat, i. e. , they have political connection. Although politically connected CEOs are detrimental to shareholders＇ interests （Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Fan, et. al. , 2007 ）, the political power increases their ability to be insulated from involuntary replacement by internal governance （Pi and Lowe, 2010）. Recent studies document that media act positively in improving corporate governance （Dyck and Zingales, 2008; Li and Shen, 2010, etc. ）. However, none of them indicate the role of media in disciplining politically connected CEOs. This paper fills the gap by examining whether media shaming could increase the likelihood that politically connected CEOs will be replaced after they made ＂bad＂ acquisitions. We propose that there are two main mechanisms through which media have an effect. First, the criticisms of ＂bad＂ acquisitions in the press could shame the CEOs to resign, or exert pressure on board of directors to replace the CEOs. Second, media pressure forces regulators into action and even trigger some legal punishment of CEOs＇ misbehavior. To test our hypothesis, we study the ease of China over the 1998 to 2008 period. The cultural and institutional setting of China offers us a useful laboratory setting for such a study ： First, shaming, or put other people to shame, is part of the Confucian cultural heritage. When other people pointed out the misbehavior of a righteous person, he will feel shameful, remorse, and will try to remedy it. Therefore, under such a cultural environment, media shaming is more likely to play a role in reducing corporate governance violation. Second, China is characterized by a vast diversity across provinces. China was split into small and independent countries in 65% of the time in China＇s history, from 841 BC to 1911 A
出处
《经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第2期57-65,共9页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目"基于知识产权保护视角的高科技公司财务行为研究"(71002042)
福建省自然科学基金项目"知识产权保护对我国高科技企业发展的影响机制研究"(2010J05152)
关键词
政治关联
媒体监督
高管变更
political connection
media supervision
CEO turnover
