摘要
在单条航线上航空公司在制定票价、运量策略时不仅要顾及到消费者的需求,还需要考虑到竞争对手的策略,本文运用博弈论的方法,构造了在单条航线上的双寡头博弈模型,研究航空公司在产出无法轻易改变的情况下的运营策略。发现无论是在一条航线上占优势地位的航空公司或是占有率较低的航空公司,都存在这样的策略性行为,即在航班计划无法改变的情况下一次性将价格降至特定范围,并不会引发价格战,反而会增加博弈双方的收益。依此还可以推导出差异化定价可以使航空公司获得更高的利润。
The strategy for airlines on price and output depends both on the demand of the consumers and the tactics taken by rivals. A duopoly game will be built on a single route to find out which price strategy airlines will take when there is little possible to change the output. A kind of strategic pricing is that reducing the price to a particular range. That reduction will not incur the rival＇s retaliation, on the contrary, it may increase the profit for both companies. At the same time, the evidence of how the differential pricing make more profit will be exhibited.
出处
《综合运输》
2016年第2期46-52,共7页
China Transportation Review
关键词
寡头
定价策略
单条航线
duopoly game
strategic pricing
single route
