摘要
本文应用期权博弈理论研究了在双寡头垄断的市场结构下 ,企业进行产品升级投资决策的问题 ,分析了在抢占均衡和同时投资均衡的情况下企业最优产品升级投资时机。研究表明 ,随着升级投资所导致的成本下降程度的增加 ,企业升级投资的临界值降低 ,这一结果与管理实践的直觉相一致 ,为企业的产品升级投资决策提供了理论指导。
In this paper,we study the problem on investment in upgrading product under duopoly market structure with options game theory.Optimal time of investment in upgrading product is analyzed under preemption equilibrium and simultaneous equilibrium.The result indicates that decreasing the price of product leads to a lower optimal investment threshold.The result is consistent with the intuition in the management practice.Thus theoretical guide to investment in upgrading product is proposed.
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
2005年第1期65-70,共6页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
高等学校博士学科点基金项目 ( 2 0 0 3 0 2 86 0 0 8)
关键词
产品升级
期权博弈
抢占均衡
同时均衡
product upgrading
option game
preemption equilibrium
simultaneous equilibrium
