摘要
本文从监管者视角,研究了中国煤炭安全监管体系中"内部监管"的有效性。通过构建"关系压力"下监管者的模型,本文发现,为了有效激励安监员,一线工人的选择必须同时纳入系统考虑。进一步,通过搜集10家煤矿企业2012—12013年的安全监察数据,对"内部监管"有效性进行了实证检验。结果表明,由于激励设置的不当,工作数量即出勤天数和安监员的岗位级别对安监员收入有显著影响。而反映监管质量的不安全行为查处和处罚,对安监员的收入都没有显著性影响。"关系压力"下的安监员选择了最小监管量,导致了"内部监管"流于形式,与煤矿的安全生产水平关系不明。
In recent years,the safety production records（mortality per million tons） in coal mines of China has made tremendous progress,which was owing to the advanced mining technology and the renewed production facilities such as safety monitoring and remote control technology.However,large gap still exists between China and other advanced coal- producing countries.The improvement in safety brought by technology and rapidly is starting to diminish gradually.Thus the next leap of safe production should acquire from the soft environment in which employees especially front- line staffs＇ safety awareness and officers＇ safety supervision system count the most.In this paper,we study the effectiveness of the ＂internal supervision＂ which in China＇s coal safety supervision system from the perspective of supervisors.First,by introducing relationship stress into the supervisors＇ models,we found in China the supervisors＇ moral hazard more from ＂ the guan-xi costs＂ caused by the punishment brought to its regulatory pressure.This makes it hard for Supervisor in strict accordance with the implementation of the client＇s intentions,in particular when monitoring and penalties closely.In order to encourage supervisor work harder,incentive setting must compliance with workers＇ gains,achieving a stable supervision balance.Second,by collecting data,we found the relationship between coal mine safe production levels and their internal safety regulatory system is not clear.The safe production days and the most important means of monitoring,unsafe behavior investigation are not statistically relevant.The mines with more days of safe production may have more unsafe behavior or very little,the same is true to other mines with less safety production days as well.During the survey,we found the amounts of unsafe behavior were just related to the target.If the target was set high,the corresponding amount of unsafe behavior investigation was large.Therefore,we are unable to judge the status of production safety just from the am
出处
《经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第12期49-55,共7页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
基金
中国矿业大学社会科学基金"煤矿生产安全绩效考核的锦标赛机制优化研究"(2013W04)
神华集团"神华集团煤炭生产安全经济激励机制优化研究"(CSIE12022090)
关键词
内部监管
关系压力
激励
internal supervision
pressure
incentive
