摘要
我国生态环境污染的防治是由中央政府委托地方政府监督当地企业实施的,此特点决定了地方政府在中央政府和企业之间扮演着"中间人"的角色,即在我国环境污染防治过程中,存在着"中央政府—地方政府—企业"双重委托代理关系,地方政府的行为选择对环境污染防治起着至关重要的作用。但从我国环境污染防治的实践来看,多处地方政府在政策执行过程中,罔顾中央委托,充当污染企业的"保护伞",政企合谋现象相当普遍。出现地方政府与企业合谋的原因,除了地方政府政绩考评体系过于强调GDP、环境保护绩效评价制度不合理等现实原因外,还存在中央政府对地方政府的激励机制不够合理的原因。为此,设计好一套科学有效的激励契约来防范地方政府与企业合谋,对当前我国环境污染的防治就显得十分必要和迫切。
The central government has commissioned the local governments to supervise the enterprises about the control of environmental pollution,which implies that the local governments play the role of a go-between.That is,there lies a double principal-agent model between the central government,local governments and enterprises so that the local governments play the decisive parts in the environmental control.The central government＇s attitude towards the cooperation between local governments and enterprises mainly depends on the trade-off between social cost caused by environmental pollution and compensation to the local government.When the social cost is greater than the critical value,the central government should adopt incentive contract,otherwise the fixed contract.This paper studies factors influencing the effect of incentive contract payment by using static analysis,considering the realistic reasons for a lot of environmental pollution accidents,and putting forward policy suggestions.The paper provides a theoretical reference about how to prevent collusion between government and enterprises in the Chinese ecological civilization construction so as to effectively promote the ecological environment governance.
出处
《河南大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第4期62-68,共7页
Journal of Henan University(Social Sciences）
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目"中国转变经济发展方式推动科学发展对策研究"(11AZD001)阶段性成果
关键词
环境污染
双重委托代理
政企合谋
契约设计
environmental pollution
double principal-agent
cooperation
contract
