摘要
通过ICT促进节能减排,实现低碳经济发展,需要ICT低碳方案提供商、高能耗工业企业及政府的共同努力。基于博弈论分析高能耗工业企业与ICT低碳方案提供商通过收入分享方式合作时,本文分析了各方的最优投入水平,以及政府激励和监管的协调作用。研究表明收入分享比例是影响合作与否的关键;政府资金资助和监管惩罚力度、税收优惠能分别提高ICT低碳方案提供商和高能耗工业企业的最优投入,协调双方因收入分享比例导致的利益冲突,但须合理设置经费资助的首期拨付比例。
The joint efforts of ICY low carbon program provider, high energy consumption of industrial enterprises and the govern- ment are needed to promote energy saving and emission reduction to achieve the development of low carbon economy through the ICT. The optimal investment of high energy consumption of industrial enterprises and ICT low carbon program provider and the coordination effect of government incentives and regulatory are analyzed based on the game theory under income sharing cooperation condition. Research shows that revenue sharing rate is the key influence of cooperation. The government funding and regulatory penalties, tax incentives can respec- tively improve the optimal investment of ICY low carbon solutions providers and high energy consumption of industrial enterprises, and coor- dinate conflicts caused by income share proportion, but the first pav rate of funding approoriation must be reasonablv set.
出处
《工业技术经济》
北大核心
2015年第2期106-110,共5页
Journal of Industrial Technological Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(项目编号:71271119)
高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金项目(项目编号:20113223110007)
江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学基金(项目编号:2012SJB630049)
南京邮电大学引进人才基金(项目编号:NYS211011)
关键词
ICT
低碳
节能减排
协同创新
博弈行为
协调策略
ICY
low- carbon
energy saving and emission reduction
cooperative innovation
game behavior
coordinationstrategy
