摘要
最低工资制度是历史形成并在现实中普遍存在的制度安排。本文把工人采取社会行动导致市场"停摆"的可能引入市场分析框架,通过构建一个资本所有者和劳动者的无限期界动态博弈模型,对最低工资制度做出了一种政治经济学解释。本文对基本模型的分析表明,与工人可能采取行动终止市场运行并且没有最低工资制度的情况相比,政府实行最低工资制度不仅可以提高劳动者的福利,而且在一定条件下也可以提高资本所有者的福利,从而实现社会的帕累托改善。本文还分析了工人集团存在分裂的可能、熟练工人与非熟练工人的划分以及经济波动对模型基本结论的影响。
The minimum wage has evolved over the history and became a widely applied institutional arrangement in the real world. Taking into consideration the possibility of market shutdown caused by workers＇ social actions ,this article builds an infinite horizon dynamic game model between workers and capitalists, and offers an political economic explanation for the minimum wage. The basic model shows that, comparing to the case where there is workers＇ social actions but not minimum wages, the minimum wage enforced by the government may not only raise the welfare of workers, hut also that of capitalists under certain conditions, which means the realization of Pareto improvement. We then introduce influencing factors including the possibility of split inside the workers＇ group, economic fluctuation and the partition between skilled and unskilled workers, and analysis their effects on our main conclusions.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第12期113-125,共13页
Economic Research Journal
基金
2012年度国家社会科学基金项目(批准号:12BJL041)
中国科学技术发展战略研究院课题(2012SE-0212)的资助
关键词
最低工资制度
劳资关系
社会行动
Minimum Wage
Employee-Employer Relations
Social Action
