摘要
本文以2008-2012年间家族上市公司为样本,实证研究了家族控制、制度冲突与企业间接掏空行为的关系,研究结果显示:家族控制与企业间接掏空行为正相关,即家族控制的上市公司存在较高的掏空可能性;家族股权集中度会抑制家族控制对企业掏空行为的促进作用,企业的隐性风险降低;市场化程度会影响家族股权集中度对企业隐性风险的调节作用,即市场化程度高的地区家族企业的风险较低,而市场化程度较低的地区家族企业的风险则较高。
Taking listed family companies data from 2008 to 2012 as example, this paper carries out an empirical study on the relationship among family governance, institutional conflict and indirect tunneling behavior. The study results show： family management is positively related to indirect tunneling behavior, which means there is a higher possibility of tunneling in listed family company; family ownership concentration will inhibit the tunneling behavior of family businesses, the risk of firm will be reduced ; the degree of marketization will affect the regulation effect of family ownership concentration on hidden risk, which means in the high level region of marketization, family business has lower risk, but in the low level region of marketization, family business has higher risk.
出处
《商业研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第10期106-111,共6页
Commercial Research
基金
国家自然科学基金重点项目
项目编号:71333007
广东省自然科学基金一般项目
项目编号:s2011010002561
关键词
家族企业
关联担保
股权集中度
制度冲突
掏空
family business
loan guarantees to related - parties
ownership concentration
institutional copflict
tunneling
