摘要
本文以2006年2月至2007年6月15日实施非公开发行的105家上市公司为样本,结合我国上市公司股权集中的制度背景,考察发行折价与大股东利益动机的关系。发现大股东财富转移动机越强,上市公司发行折价越大,表现出壕沟效应和大小股东的利益冲突;大小股东之间的利益协同程度越高,发行折价越低;实际控制人类型,特别是国有与民营之间的发行折价没有显著差别。非公开发行折价影响大小股东之间的利益分配,值得监管部门和市场主体关注,警惕大股东侵占中小股东的利益。
This article tests the relationship between offering price discount and the motivation of large stockholder using data from 105 listed companies that issued new shares through private offering during February 2006 to June 15 2007. The results suggest that the stronger the large shareholder＇ s motivation to transfer wealth from minor shareholders, the more offering price discount is, which shows that entrenchment effects and interest conflict between two kinds of shareholders. It is also suggested that interest convergence between large and minor shareholders can lower offering price discount, while different types of controller show no divergence in price discount. Both regulatory body and market participants should pay attention to private offering price discount because of its wealth effects, especially of the fact that large stockholder may manipulate offering price to tunnel.
出处
《证券市场导报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第8期28-35,共8页
Securities Market Herald
关键词
定向增发
非公开发行
大股东掏空
发行折价
公司治理
Additional oriental issue
Private offering
tunneling
price discount
corporate governance
