摘要
主流观点认为,大股东侵占导致了我国定向增发高折价现象。然而,基于投资者保护视角分析发行折价的理论来源发现,高折价源于发行人原股东向发行对象的财富转移。基于力量博弈视角的分析发现,导致这种财富转移的两个关键性力量中,政策制度是决定发行折价空间的基础性力量;大股东是在政策基础性力量之下的主导性力量。政策基础性力量对发行折价的影响,在宏观层面体现在融资溢价分配的制度设计时,向发行对象实施了利益倾斜;在操作层面体现在政策改革行为和定价发行方式定价机制的认购期权属性两个方面,这构成了高折价现象的深层制度成因。大股东主导性力量对发行折价的影响表现在高折价背景之下:如何维护作为原股东的自身利益,顺应环境与外部发行对象一起侵占中小股东利益。因此,高折价现象具有投资拉动型经济增长模式确保发行对象收益的时代背景,根源于现有融资政策的制度设计。
It is universally believed that the tunneling has led to the high issuediscount of private equity placements in China.However,if we analyze the theoretical source of issue-discount from the perspective of investor protection,it is found that the high issue-discount stems from wealth transfer from the issuer’s original shareholders to the issue target.The analysis based on the perspective of the power game found that among the two key forces leading to this wealth transfer,the policy system is the fundamental one that determines the issue discount space and the major shareholder is the dominant one under the policy fundamental force.At the macro level,the influence of policy fundamental forces on the issue discount is reflected by implementing a tilt of interest to the issue target when designing the financing premium distribution system.At the operational level,it is reflected by both the policy reform behavior and the call option property of pricing mechanism,which constitutes a deep institutional cause of the high discount phenomenon.The influence of the shareholder’s dominant power on the issue discount is manifested in the context of a high discount:how to maintain the self-interest of the original shareholder;embezzle the interests of small and medium shareholders in accordance with environment and external distribution objects.Therefore,the phenomenon of high discount has an era background of ensuring the benefits of the issue target under the investment-driven economic growth model.And it roots in the institutional design of existing financing policies.
作者
熊发礼
林乐芬
Xiong Fali;Lin Lefen(School of Business,Jinling Institute of Technology,211169;College of Finance,Nanjing Agricultural University,210095)
出处
《制度经济学研究》
2020年第3期245-267,共23页
Research on Institutional Economics
基金
金陵科技学院高层次人才科研启动项目(jit-b-201835)
江苏高校哲学社会科学研究一般项目(2020SJA0549)的资助
关键词
经济增长模式
发行定价机制
定向增发
高折价现象
投资者保护
Economic Growth Pattern
Issuing Pricing Mechanism
Private Equity Placements
High Issue-discount Phenomenon
Investor Protection
