期刊文献+

基于多任务分配的企业低碳研发人员激励机制设计 被引量:3

On Multitask Allocation-based Incentive Mechanism Design for Enterprise Low-carbon R&D Personnel
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摘要 在借鉴Homstrom和Milgrom提出的多任务—委托代理模型的基础上,运用工作设计理论从任务分配的角度建立企业低碳研发人员激励机制模型并进行了系统分析,结果表明对研发人员(团队)实行专业化分工优于共同负责制,即专业化分工能够强化激励效果,而工种设计应根据任务的监督的难易来进行的,易于监督的工作任务交给同一个研发人员(团队)(团队),难以监督的工作任务交给另一个研发人员(团队)。 Based on muhitask-agent entrusted model proposed by Homstrom and Milgrom, with work design theory, in-centive mechanism for enterprise low - carbon R&D personnel is established and systematically analyzed from task allocation perspective. The result shows that specialized division of work for R&D personnel (team) is superior to co - responsibility system; specialized division of work can intensify incentive effect, while the specialty design should be done according to the difficulty of supervision over task. The work task that is easy to be overseen should be assigned to one R&D personnel (team), while that work task that is hard to be supervised should be assigned to another D&R personnel (team) .
作者 孙芬
出处 《科技管理研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第20期133-137,共5页 Science and Technology Management Research
基金 江苏高校优势学科建设工程资助项目
关键词 专业化分工 机制设计 工种设计 低碳研发人员 specialized division of work mechanism design specialty design low - carbon R&D personnel
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参考文献11

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