摘要
传统经济学理论建立在自利的人性假设之上,但事实上在许多情形下,公平意识会影响人的行为。以薪酬激励合约为中介,构建不同产权基础的公司与不同经理人员特质的内生配置模型,把不公平厌恶偏好的异质性纳入到配置模型中,以310位企业经理人员作为实验对象,通过一组独裁者博弈实验和两组策略博弈实验共9 014次分配决策,检验被试几种主要类型的社会偏好,从中甄别出经理人员不公平厌恶偏好的相对强度,结合调查问卷的数据证实经理人员不公平厌恶偏好、努力水平、公司股权结构和公司绩效之间由薪酬激励契约联结起来的内生配置关系。研究结果表明,具有不同公平性偏好的行为人对于等额的薪酬不公平的反应有所不同,从而影响合约的履行效果,控制权收益对薪酬的浮动部分具有替代效应,产生反向的激励效应,替代程度越大,反向激励效果越大。
Traditional economic theory is built on the assumption of self-interest as the human nature, but in many cases, the sense of fairness also affects behaviors. Taking the compensation incentive contract as mediating factor, this paper constructs en- dogenous configuration models of companies with different property basis and variant managers＇ traits, and the heterogeneity of in- equity aversion preference is fitted into the model. Taking 310 managers from enterprises as the research sample, the researchers conduct 9 014 allocation decisions through a game experiment on dictators and two strategy game experiments, test the main types of social preference, and distinguish intensities of inequity aversion preference of managers. Finally, with the data from survey questionnaires, this study proves the endogenous configuration relationship of the inequity aversion preference of managers, the level of efforts, the ownership structure and the firm performance connected by the compensation incentive contract. The results show that people with different levels of equity preference have various reactions on the same amount of compensation, thereby af- fecting the performance of the contract. The benefits of control can partially substitute the floating part of compensation, leading to a negative incentive effect. That is, the more the substitution is, the greater the negative incentive effects are.
出处
《管理科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第4期46-59,共14页
Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金(71032006)
国家社会科学基金(12CGL034)
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(13YJC630205)
广东省哲学社会科学十二.五规划学科共建项目(GD12XGL12)
广东省高等学校人文社会科学重点研究基地重大研究项目(09JDXM63005)~~
关键词
不公平厌恶偏好
薪酬契约
股权结构
实验分析
inequity aversion preference
compensation contract
ownership structure
experimental analysis
