摘要
基于博弈理论,考察了农村税费改革以来,中央政府、地方政府和农民三个利益主体在农村公共物品供给中的博弈关系,并提出了有效增加农村公共物品供给的对策。
Based on the game theory, it was studied that the game relationship of central government, local government and peasant in rural public goods supply after the tax and fee reform, and countermeasures of effectively increasing rural public goods supply were put forward.
出处
《贵州农业科学》
CAS
北大核心
2013年第7期206-211,共6页
Guizhou Agricultural Sciences
基金
湖北省人文社科重点研究基地--大别山旅游经济与文化研究中心项目"大别山农耕文化旅游与区域经济社会发展研究"(2012CR015)
关键词
后农业税时代
农村公共物品
博弈
post-agricultural tax time
rural public goods
game
