摘要
本研究通过对2005—2006年信息技术行业上市公司数据进行的研究表明，独立董事比例、持股董事比例与自愿性信息披露水平显著正相关；两职合一与自愿性信息披露水平显著负相关；董事会规模、董事会会议次数与自愿性信息披露之间相关性不显著。这些研究结论对于改进董事会治理、提高上市公司信息披露质量有一定的启示意义。
Compelled information disclosure and voluntary information disclosure are part of information disclo- sure of listed companies. The former refers to the information explicitly stipulated by laws and regulations that must be disclosed while the latter refers to the information disclosure except the compelled information disclosure, the in- formation that listed companies volunteer to disclose out of corporation image, investor relations, avoidance of litiga- tion risk and other motives. Not all information excluding the information that is compelled to be disclosed belongs to voluntary disclosure. The information of voluntary disclosure should be of value relevance and be able to help the in- vestors and obliges learn the strategies of the company, key factors of management, environment of competition, deci- sion-making frame and the measures taken by the company in order to ensure the sustainable management. The board of directors is the core of corporate governance, plays a key role in overseeing the generation and fi- nal disclosure of the managers＇ regular report, and board characteristics affect the level of voluntary information dis- closure. In China, only a few papers testing board characteristics influence on voluntary information disclosure are in the way of empirical methods, and the research on the number of characteristic variables, such as board meeting and board of director＇s shareholding proportion, on voluntary disclosure is involved less. Through the study of information technology industry listed Corporation in 2005 and 2006, the study shows that ： the proportion of independent directors, shareholding proportion in board of directors and the level of voluntary information disclosure are in significantly positive correlation ; Chair-CEO duality and the level of voluntary informa- tion disclosure is negatively correlated ; the size of the board of directors as well as the number of the meeting of the board of directors and the level of voluntary information disclosure is not significantly
出处
《经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第7期154-160,共7页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
基金
国家社会科学基金项目"融资偏好视角下中小投资者利益保护机制与对策研究"(12BGL033)
