摘要
本文选取2006～2011年我国沪深两市几乎所有实施定向增发的非金融上市公司作为研究样本,利用大样本数据把大股东控制和投资者情绪对定向增发折价的影响进行全面实证检验。研究发现:在一级市场中,当大股东参与认购时,其能够获取定向增发的折价水平就比较高,机会主义动机越强,折价水平越高,大股东控制作用比较明显;在二级市场中,投资者情绪与定向增发折价也存在正相关关系,投资者情绪高低显著影响折价水平的大小;最后,本文也发现大股东控制作用也受到投资者情绪的影响,在牛市下大股东控制作用容易导致发生掏空行为,在熊市及震荡市下,大股东的控制作用受到一定约束,他们可能会通过虚增资产来达到利益输送的目的。
This paper chooses non-financial companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from the year 2006 to 2011 as sample and conducts a study on the influence of the big shareholder control and investor sentiment to discount of private placement.It finds that,in the primary market,when big shareholders participate in the subscription,they can obtain higher directional additional discount level than that in the case without their participation.The more op-portunism motivation,the higher the discount level and the big shareholder control effect is more apparent.In the secondary market,investors sentiment and directional additional discount also have positive correlation.The paper also finds that large shareholders' control effect is affected by investor sentiment.In a bear market,large shareholders' control effect is under certain constraints.
出处
《金融评论》
2013年第2期46-60,124-125,共15页
Chinese Review of Financial Studies
关键词
大股东控制
投资者情绪
定向增发折价
Big Shareholder Control
Investor Sentiment
Discount of Private Placement
