摘要
本文利用Spencer和Brander(1983)的第三国市场模型,考虑一个中间品垄断企业向位于本国的一个下游企业和位于外国的另一个下游企业同时出口中间品时,一国政府的战略性研发政策。研究结果表明,一国最优的战略性研发政策是对生产外包企业的研发进行征税,而对生产内包企业的研发进行补贴。此外,两国的战略性研发政策随产品差异度的变化而有可能导致"零和博弈",也有可能陷入"囚徒困境"。而当两国进行研发政策合作时,两国的最优研发政策为补贴,这与Spencer和Brander(1983)的结论正好相反。
This paper analyses a governmental strategic R&D policies in the case of intermediate product trade by using the third market model of Spencer and Brander(1983) when a downstream firm competes with another downstream firm located a different country which has a monopoly upstream firm also.The result shows that the strategic R&D policies of country that just has a downstream firm are taxes,but another country's are subsidies when only a country' s government intervenes native firm' s R&D.When both governments could intervene own firm's R&D,the country which has a downstream firm takes tax policy and the other country which has a downstream and a monopoly upstream firm takes subsidy.Two countries'R&D policies may be 'zero-sum game'or 'prisoner's dilemma'dependent on the goods difference level.On the contrary with Spencer and Brander(1983),the optimal R&D's policies are subsidies when two countries cooporate.
出处
《世界经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第6期16-21,87,共6页
World Economy Studies
