摘要
在Spencer和Brander(1983)模型的基础上,本文引入产品纵向控制因素,考虑生产高质量产品的非一体化企业与另一国生产低质量产品的一体化企业进行市场竞争时,政府的最优研发政策。在企业进行Cournot竞争的情形下,若产品质量差异较大(小),非一体化企业所在国政府的最优研发政策为征税(补贴),而在企业进行Bertrand竞争的情形下,非一体化企业所在国政府的最优研发策略则是征税。
Extending the model of Spencer and Brander(1983),the paper analyses the government′s R&D policy when an un-integrated domestic firm which produce high quality product competes with an integrated foreign firm which produce low quality final product on the basis of intermediate goods trade.The domestic firm must purchase the key intermediate goods to produce the final product from the foreign competitor as the foreign competitor monopolies the intermediate goods.We find that the optimal R&D policy is tax (subsidy) in the setting of Cournot competition when the degree of quality differentiation is larger (lower) while taxing is the optimal R&D policy in the setting of Bertrand competition.
出处
《世界经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第9期64-69,共6页
World Economy Studies
