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随机需求下第三方物流的Nash均衡与协调策略 被引量:1

Nash equilibriums and coordination strategies for third party logistics under stochastic demand
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摘要 针对供应商、第三方物流服务商与零售商组成的3层供应链系统,研究了随机需求下考虑缺货或滞销成本的主从对策与收益分配问题.理论分析表明独立决策下供应链系统利润最低,第三方物流服务商的物流服务质量难以保证,而联合决策下系统利润达到最优,运用基于合作满意度的Nash协商收益分配机制能激励第三方物流服务商提高物流服务水平,各成员所得收益均比独立决策时有大幅度提高,促进了供应链系统的高效运转,实现了系统的完美协调.最后,通过数值算例对上述结论作了进一步分析。 Aiming at the three-echelon supply chain system composed of supplier,third party logistics(TPL) service provider and retailer,Stackelberg game and profit allocation considering unsalable cost or out punishment under the stochastic demand were studied.Theoretical analysis shows that the supply chain system by independent decision-making has the least profit,and the quality of TPL provider's logistics service can't be assured,while through united decision-making,the profit of the system may arrive at the maximum level,and the application of Nash negotiable income distribution mechanism based on cooperation satisfaction will stimulate TPL provider to improve logistics service level,and the income received by each member will improve largely comparing with that in independent decision-making.It also may promote the effective operation of supply chain system,thus achieving perfect coordination of the system.Finally,the conclusion was further analyzed through numerical examples.
出处 《中国科学技术大学学报》 CAS CSCD 北大核心 2013年第3期223-228,共6页 JUSTC
基金 国家社会科学基金(11CGL029) 国家自然科学基金(71131002 70971041) 高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金(20060359007) 安徽省高等学校自然科学研究项目(KJ2010B337) 安徽农业大学青年科学基金(2009zr26)资助
关键词 供应链 第三方物流 完美协调 随机需求 supply chain third party logistics perfect coordination stochastic demand
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