摘要
本文就一类资源分配问题提出一个主从对策模型。在这个模型中上级决策者根据各个下级决策者汇报的信息进行资源的最优分配。为了获得准确的信息,上级决策者采用本文提出的“混合策略”激励方式来引导下级决策者如实汇报情况。在较弱的假设下,我们证明上级决策者所作出的分配方案是近似最优的。此外,本文的这个资源分配模型比较适合中国的国情,其方法具有很好的操作性。
An incentive game model is proposed for resource allocation. In our model, the leader decision maker allocates resources to n departments based on the information, provided by n follower decision makers rcspectively, about the optimal beneficial result of each department to utilize the possibly gained resources. The leader decision maker can induce the follower decision makers to provide the true information via a mixed incentive strategy presented in this paper. Under a very mild assumption, we prove that the allocation decision made by the leader decision maker is almost optimal.
出处
《中国科学院研究生院学报》
CAS
CSCD
1992年第3期246-253,共8页
Journal of the Graduate School of the Chinese Academy of Sciences
基金
国家自然科学基金 项目编号G 78900011
关键词
资源分配
主从对策
激励策略
决策
resource allocation, leader-follower games, incentive strategies
