摘要
针对面向多制造商的供应商研发决策问题,分别构造了供应商在选择共性技术和专用性技术研发决策情形下与两个制造商组成的两阶段非合作博弈模型,得到了供应商在这两种情形下各自的最优研发决策,通过对这两种最优决策情形下供应商最大化利润进行比较,给出了这两种情形下供应商最大化利润相等的条件和各自的占优区间。进一步讨论了供应部件单位成本、供应部件价格、最终产品替代率、单位研发成本变动对这两种情形下供应商最优研发决策的影响,并给出了相应的数值解,表明供应商采用不同技术研发决策时最优研发程度和最大化利润与供应部件单位成本、单位研发成本、最终产品替代率负相关,供应商最优研发程度与供应部件价格正相关;随着供应部件价格的递增,供应商最大化利润先增加后减少。
Aiming at the supplier＇s development decision problem oriented to multi-manufacturer, a two-stage noncooperative game model which composed of a supplier and two manufacturers was proposed under the situations that the supplier made the optimal development decision based on generic technologies and specific technologies. By comparing the supplier＇s maximum profits of these two optimal decisions, the respective dominant intervals as well as the conditions which made the two maximum profits be equal were obtained. Furthermore, the influence of supplied component＇s unit cost, supplied component＇s price, products＇ substitution rate and development cost fluctuation on supplier＇s optimal development decision under these two situations was discussed, and the corresponding numerical solutions were given. It showed that the optimal development degree and the maximum profits with different development decisions were negative correlated with supplied component＇s unit cost, supplied component＇s price, products＇ substitution rate and development cost fluctuation, but the supplier＇s optimal development degree was pos- itive correlated to supplied component＇s price. With the increasing of supplied eomponent＇s price, the supplier＇s maximum profits was increased first and then decreased.
出处
《计算机集成制造系统》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2012年第12期2756-2764,共9页
Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70872122)
教育部人文社会科学研究基金资助项目(09YJC630248)~~
关键词
供应商
共性技术
专用性技术
研发决策
博弈模型
supplier
generic technology
specific technology
development decision
game model
