摘要
基于进化博弈理论,研究了非对称状态下同性质物流企业物流联盟的合作协调问题.通过对非对称物流联盟特征的描述,标定进化博弈分析的基本条件,设计复制动态方程进行合作进化博弈分析,以相位图形式表达物流联盟合作关系的进化演变过程,并讨论了合作概率与各因素的变动关系.研究结果表明,物流企业联盟合作的稳定性与合作成本、保留收益、联盟收益以及利益分配率等因素相关,联盟收益与利益分配率越大,博弈双方的合作意愿越强,联盟越趋于稳定.最后通过算例验证了分析结果的可行性.
Based on the theory of evolution game, the symbiosis problem of logistics enter- prises alliance which have the same property during asymmetric state is discussed. Through the description about the characteristics of asymmetric logistics alliance, the basic condi- tions for evolution game is s Landardized, the replicated dynamic equation is designed to ana- lyze the cooperative evolution game, the phase diagram is used to express the evolution process about the symbiosis of logistics alliance, and the variance relationship between co- operative probability and each relevant factors. The result shows that the stability of logis- tics alliance is related to cooperative costs, retained profits, alliance profits and interest rate of distribution. The greater alliance profits and interest rate of distribution, the stronger cooperative willingness of the two sides of the game, and the alliance becomes steadier. Fi- nally, an example is designed to test the feasibility of the analyzed results.
出处
《长沙理工大学学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
2012年第1期29-33,共5页
Journal of Changsha University of Science and Technology:Natural Science
基金
湖南省科技计划资助项目(2010FG6016)
湖南省教育厅科研计划资助项目(11C1076)
关键词
物流联盟
非对称
稳定性
合作关系
进化博弈
logistics alliance asymmetric stability symbiosis evolution game
