摘要
文中运用演化博弈对物流供需企业的博弈过程进行研究,最终得出两者之间不存在演化稳定策略,而两者的均衡结果依赖于两者的初始状态,初始状态的选择依赖于两者的监督、努力成本和惩罚金额以及两者选择策略的比例。
This paper studies the game process of logistics supply and demand enterprises by using evolutionary game. Finally there is no evolutionary stable strategy between the two sides.The initial state of equilibrium results depends on the initial state of the two and the choice depends on the supervision cost, effort cost and the amount of punishment as well as the two selection strategy proportion.
出处
《物流工程与管理》
2015年第7期14-15,25,共3页
Logistics Engineering and Management
关键词
演化博弈
演化稳定
复制动态
evolutionary game theory
evolutionary stability
dynamic replication
