摘要
劳动合同法开始实施以后,政府和企业双方的博弈加剧。企业的抵制规避,政府的监管不力,都使法律的实施效果大打折扣。从如何使企业自觉遵守《劳动合同法》及尽量降低政府监督检查的成本2个层面建立博弈模型,以期《劳动合同法》能够得到预期的执行效果。
With the background of the Labour Contract Law has been implemented,the game between government and enterprises are increasing.The effect to the implementation of the law has greatly reduced by enterprises’ resistance and government’s lack of supervision.This Article sets a game model from two levels—how to enable enterprises to conscientiously abide by the ＂Labor Contract Law＂ and minimize the cost of supervision and inspection of the government—to facilitate the implementation of Labour Contract Law to achieve the expected results.
出处
《科技与管理》
2011年第4期84-87,共4页
Science-Technology and Management
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(06JA630042)
上海市(第三期)管理科学与工程重点学科(S30504)
上海市教委科研创新重点项目(10ZS96)
关键词
劳动合同法
政府
企业
博弈
纳什均衡
Labor Contract Law； government； enterprise； game； Nash equilibrium
