摘要
国企高管能够获得过度的控制权收益,这是我国特有的现象。通过构造包含业绩与监督力的高管效用函数,对包含监督力与业绩的高管效用替代机理进行分析,发现:在企业持续经营过程中,高管显性报酬对控制权收益具有替代的作用,并且该替代程度不同,激励的效果也有差异,较强的替代程度能导致较好的会计业绩;在替代过程中,对高管监督力的变化差异会导致替代程度的差异进而影响激励效果的差异,适度增强的监督力度将通过替代机理作用于激励效果,产生良好的会计业绩。建议我国国有企业在设计高管激励机制、以显性报酬替代控制权收益时,应充分重视和设计好监督力的变化幅度。
Top managers especially those in state-owned enterprises have high access of control right benefits in China. This paper reconstructs top managers' utility function concerning corporate performance and supervision power and studies the mechanism of top managers' explicit rewards,control right benefits,accounting performance and supervision power. The results show that in the process of daily operation,there lies substitution of top managers' explicit rewards to control right benefits and this substitution is advantageous to promoting accounting performance and in the substitution process of explicit rewards to control right benefits,variations of supervision power to top managers may lead to variable substitution,which then determines accounting performance or variation of shareholder wealth-the more power the supervision,the stronger the substitution and then the greater the promotion to accounting performance,and unchanging supervision may lead to weak substitution and then weak promotion of accounting performance.
出处
《当代经济科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第1期34-40,共7页
Modern Economic Science
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究项目基金资助
项目名称<中国上市公司高管显性报酬对控制权收益的替代及其效果研究>(批准号09YJC790134)
关键词
控制权收益
显性报酬
替代机理
监督力
Control right benefits
explicit rewards
Substitution mechanism
Supervision power
