摘要
笔者通过数学模型推演,从理论上分析不同监督力情况下高管减薪的后果,研究发现:在企业持续经营过程中,高管减薪能够导致高管控制权收益对薪酬的替代,替代作用产生了负的激励效果,并且替代程度越大,负向激励效果越明显;监督力的强弱是决定替代程度大小的关键因素,不变或弱化的监督力能够强化高管控制权收益对薪酬的替代程度。研究结果表明,无论监督力在减薪前后如何变化,限薪令都可能是一项失败的政策,类似于中国这样已经颁布限薪令的国家,在限薪的同时应该大力加强对高管的监督力度。
Using mathematic models, the authors made a theoretical analysis of the outcome of reducing the salary of top executives in different supervision powers. The research finds that in the process of enterprises＇ sustainable operation, reducing the salary of top ex- ecutives may lead to the substitution of private benefits of control for salary, which will result in negative incentive effect. The higher the supervision power, the more obvious the negative incentive effect; the supervision power is the critical factor to determine the sub- stitution level. Unchanged or weakened supervision power may strengthen substitution of private benefits of control for salary. The re- search results suggest that no matter how the supervision power cl^anges before and after salary reduction, the salary limiting policy may be a failure. It is suggested that the supervision on top executives should be strengthened greatly while their salary is restricted in the countries like China which have issued the salary limiting decree.
出处
《经济经纬》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第4期141-144,共4页
Economic Survey
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目(09YJC790134)
2010年度辽宁工程技术大学国家自然科学基金前期资助项目(2010-075)
2011年度辽宁工程技术大学科学研究立项计划(国家自然科学基金前期资助)项目(2011ZR051)
关键词
高管薪酬
控制权收益
替代机理
监督力
salary of top executives
private benefits of control
substitution mechanism
supervision
