摘要
定量研究当零售商具有促销策略时的渠道协调。在此种情形下，渠道成员独立决策时线形契约无法促成渠道协调，通过博弈模型分析，给出一种协调数量折扣价格契约，并对渠道协调后的利润分配作了初步探讨。结果表明，制造商促使该类渠道达成协调的数量折扣有无穷多个，在一定条件下渠道成员双方利润均会增加，并给出了算例分析。同时根据数量折扣形式，对传统的“入场费”问题进行了再讨论，得出了“入场费”与渠道协调之间的关系，进而揭示出“入场费”在实践中深层含义。
Study the channel coordination when retailer choose the promotion strategy based on mathematical model. Find that the linear contract can＇t attain the coordination for the independent channel members in this situation, give another quantity discount price contract through mathematical method and an initial analysis on sharing the after coordination profits is presented. The results show that manufacturer can provide infinite quantity discounts for coordination of the channel, some of which can make both manufacturer and retailer be better under certain conditions. At last discuss the phenomenon of street money and analyze the relationship of street money and channel coordination. From this perspective, we derive testable implications with regard to the practice of street money.
出处
《上海管理科学》
2009年第4期25-29,共5页
Shanghai Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70672071)
