摘要
为探讨入厂物流的利益协调问题,提出了由一个制造商和两个零部件供应商组成的两阶供应链。以零部件供应商库存成本和制造商运输成本最小化为目标,以博弈论为基础,建立了由制造商为主方,零部件供应商为从方的两阶斯坦科尔伯格主从博弈模型。制造商采取共同订货期为基础订货和循环取货的方式,并通过相应激励来诱使供应商参与合作。该供应链协调策略实现了两阶供应链库存-配送的联合优化。通过求解斯坦克尔伯格博弈模型,得出了最优的共同订货期。订货期倍数和激励奖金的数值解。最后给出了算法和仿真分析。仿真分析讨论了相关参数变化对制造商成本、零部件供应商成本和系统总成本的影响。
To discuss revenue coordination problem of entrance logistics, a two-stage supply chain was put forward which was consisted of one manufacturer and two component-suppliers. A Stackelberg leader-follower game model based on game theory was constructed aiming to minimixe the suppliers＇ inventory cost and the manufacturers＇ transportation cost. The manufacturer ordered on the basis of common order period and used a milk-run method. To entice the suppliers to cooperate, manufacturers provided the suppliers some incentive bonus. Inventory-distribution joint optimization of the two-stage supply chain was obtained via the supply chain coordination strategy. The optimal values of common order period, order period multiples and the incentive bonus were obtained by solving the stackelberg game model. Finally, an algorithm and a simulation analysis were presented. The effect of the parameter variations on the cost of the manufacturer, the suppliers and the total system was discussed via the simulation analysis.
出处
《计算机集成制造系统》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2009年第7期1430-1435,共6页
Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772077)~~
关键词
物流
斯坦克尔伯格博弈
优化
入厂物流
仿真
供应链协调
logistics
Staekelberg game
optimization
entrance logistics
simulation
supply chain coordination
