摘要
利用委托—代理理论,阐述现行国有森林资源管理体制中政府和国有林业企业之间的委托—代理关系。从国有林业企业的外部制度环境入手,分析政府对国有林业企业的监督和激励机制的缺失和不健全的原因及影响。指出在资金扶持过程中,政府对国有林业企业监督机制和激励机制的缺失和不健全是造成林业投资效率低下的根本原因,并提出了促进政府林业投资效率提高的相关政策建议。
Applying principle- agent theory, presents the principle- agent relationship between the governments and forestry enterprises in the state- owned forest resources management system. From external system environment, the causes and impacts of absence of supervision ＆ Incentive mechanism between the governments and state- owned forestry enterprises are analyzed. Meanwhile, it points that the fundamental cause of low efficiency of government forestry investments is absence of supervision ＆ Incentive mechanism. Final, it brings up some policy advices that promote the forestry efficiency.
出处
《中国林业经济》
2009年第1期19-21,46,共4页
China Forestry Economics
关键词
政府
林业投资
低效率
监督
激励
government
forestry investment
low efficiency
supervision
incentive
