摘要
分析了供应商联合质量管理的激励机制设计问题,指出在采购商承担供应商和联合质量工程师相互帮助努力的成本后,通过使他们其中一方的奖金同另一方的业绩正相关的激励制度,可以促使供应商和联合质量工程师相互帮助,从而实现联合质量管理的目的,并且通过对诸公司联合质量管理实践的分析证明了这一结论。文中还对可能出现的供应商和联合质量工程师合谋问题提出了解决方法。
This paper mainly analyzes how to design the incentive mechanism of ＂joint quality management＂ of the supplier. It points out when the buyer takes on cost of the supplier＇s and the joint quality engineer＇s mutual help, she can induce them to help each other by incentive system which correlates positively one＇s prize to another＇s achievement so as to achieve the goals of joint quality management. Then this paper proves the above conclusion to be right through analyzing the practice of the companies that implement joint quality management. This paper also puts forward some approaches to solving the possible collusion problems that may happen between the supplier and the joint quality engineer.
出处
《系统管理学报》
北大核心
2009年第1期56-60,共5页
Journal of Systems & Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70572103)
关键词
联合质量管理
委托-代理
超级模数
joint quality management
principal-agent
supermodular
