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基于委托代理关系的公立医院院长激励约束机制研究 被引量:8

The Research of Incentive-restrain Mechanism on the Head of the Public Hospital Based on the Principal-agent Relationship
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摘要 只有把代理人的贡献程度和其报酬结合起来,把医院的社会目标和医院院长的个人目标联系在一起,通过对院长行为和绩效的度量,并实施有效的激励和约束,才能有利于解决代理问题。通过对我国公立医院院长激励机制现状的分析,在全面绩效评价的基础上,提出具体的激励和约束办法。 For solution the principal-agent problem of the head of the public hospital, should through appraisai performance of the head of the public hospital and implement effective incentive-restrain mechansm Performance appraisal of the head of the public hospital should accord goal between society and the head of the public hospital and reiate reward to contribution. Through analyzing the current Situation of public hospital incentive mechanism in our country; this art cie proposed the means of incentive and restrain based on the comprehensive performance appraisal.
出处 《中国医院管理》 北大核心 2007年第10期34-36,共3页 Chinese Hospital Management
关键词 公立医院 院长 委托代理 绩效管理 pubiic hospital, head of hospital piincipal-agent, performance management
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