摘要
基于2×2非对称演化博弈原理,分别针对电力市场中的MCP与PAB竞价机制,分析了随机电力需求下的电力竞价市场演化情况;在此基础上,从市场效率的角度对演化均衡进行政策分析,并给出了竞价市场收敛于报价下限处的条件;分析表明:①MCP机制相对于PAB机制更易使电力竞价市场收敛于报价下限处;②若报价下限一定,使电力竞价市场收敛于报价下限的报价上限要么较大要么逼近报价下限;最后进行算例分析。
This paper analyzes the market evolution of power bidding with stochastic demand based on the 2 × 2 asymmetric evolutionary game theory under MCP and PAB bidding mechanism respectively, then explores its policy analysis from the view of market efficiency and the conditions the bidding market converging to lower-limit of bid permitted is attained, and the conclusion is drawn, （1） it＇s more possible to induce the bidding market converges to lower-limit of bid under MCP than PAB mechanism, （2） the upper-limit of bid, which induces the bidding equilibrium to lower-limit, is higher or approachs to lower-limit of bid conditional the fixed lower limit of bid. Finally,a power bidding market consisting of two types genenrator is presented to illustrate the method.
出处
《系统工程》
CSCD
北大核心
2007年第1期78-82,共5页
Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70501006)
关键词
演化博弈
随机需求
市场均衡
竞价机制
电力市场
Evolutionary Game
Stochastic Demand
Market Equilibrium
Bidding Mechanism
Power Market
