摘要
在设计电能与环境协调监管-免费分配排污权制度时,必须考虑该制度下电力市场的稳定性。针对这一情况,在对有限理性的微分对策模型进行改进,提出了在免费分配排污权制度下,燃煤发电企业有限理性的Cournot动态博弈模型,并与未使用免费分配排污权的模型进行对比分析。结果表明,免费分配排污权制度可以改善电力市场的稳定性,同时给出了电力市场稳定的判断条件,使得模型的混沌现象会消失。稳定性分析的结果为政府制定免费分配排污权制度提供了依据。
The stability of the power market must be taken into account while designing the system of free distribution of the emission permits, i.e, the coordination of the power and the environment. For the purpose, this article improves the bounded rationality differential game model, and presents a bounded rationality Cournot dynamic game model for coal-fired power enterprises with the system of free distribution of the emission permits. The presented model with the system is compared with the model without the system, which demonstrates that the system is able to improve the stability of power markets, and lead to the disap- pearance of chaotic phenomena of the model.
出处
《工业工程》
北大核心
2009年第1期5-9,共5页
Industrial Engineering Journal
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(90510016)
关键词
电力市场
排污权
有限理性
稳定性
power market
emission permit
bounded rationality
stability
