摘要
在代理理论的基础上,文章介绍了上市公司融资约束的大股东代理问题。事实证明,上市公司的融资约束明显高于未上市的公司;自然人控制的上市公司比国有集团控股的上市公司面临更大的的融资约束问题。
Basing on agency theory, the paper investigates relationship between ownership structure and financial constraint level of listed companies in Chinese group corporation. Empirical evidence show that financial constraint level of listed companys in groups corporation is significantly higher than that in ungroups corporation; listed companys owned by individual groups corporation are facing more serious financial constraint than that owned by national groups one.
出处
《兰州学刊》
2007年第8期115-116,150,共3页
基金
<我国金融风险研究--企业投资控股中的融资放大效应>中的研究成果
国家自然科学基金的项目资助
项目编号:70473094
关键词
大股东
融资约束
代理理念
征用
groups corporation
financial constraint
agency theory
expropriation
