摘要
在欧洲福利国家的政治经济分析中,有一种由来已久的理论争论:在养老金改革引起的政治冲突中,到底是阶级分化还是代际分裂起主导作用?对此,本文提出一个瓦解这种传统理论分歧的假设,并以此概括出不同政治冲突出现的具体条件。文章认为,一个影响人们对养老金改革态度的关键因素是家庭养老强度,①也就是福利资源通过家庭关系的再分配程度。在养老金改革中到底会形成什么形式的政治联盟,很大程度上受到家庭养老强度的制约。当家庭养老强度较低时,代际之间的冲突更容易显露,并影响到各种政治行为者的选择;当家庭养老强度较高时,阶级分化形式的集体行动才成为主流。
This paper deals with a longstanding debate in the political economy of European welfare states,whether class conflict or generation competition is more prevalent in the politics of pension reforms.It outlines the conditions under which one kind of political conflicts is more likely than the other.Focusing on the critical issue affecting support for and opposition to pension reforms,the intensity of family support for the elderly and the extent of redistribution of social welfare between generations by family ties,the author argues that political coalitions formed in pension reforms depend on the above-mentioned 'intensity'greatly.Class coalitions are more likely where the intensity of family support for the elderly is high,whereas generation-based coalitions predominate where it is low.
出处
《欧洲研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第3期1-25,共25页
Chinese Journal of European Studies
基金
北京大学欧洲研究中心"欧洲公共政策研究"项目的一部分
"中国-欧盟欧洲研究中心(ESCP)"项目资助
