摘要
从行为金融的视角,研究了在单边道德风险的情况下,企业家的过度自信与公平感受对自利的风险投资家的风险投资契约设计与绩效的影响,即在单边委托-代理模型中,随着企业家过度自信水平的增加,不论企业家是自利型还是不平等厌恶型,风险投资家提供给企业家的最优股权比例都在减少。同时,随着企业家过度自信水平的增加,其付出的努力水平也在增加。在企业家群体中同时存在上述2种类型的企业家时,无论企业家是自利型还是不平等厌恶型,福利水平都将随着企业家过度自信水平的增加而增大。
From behavioral finance, the effects were studied of entrepreneurial overconhclence anti fairness on the venture capital financial contracting designed by a self-interested a venture capitalist and its performance under a single-sided moral risk. In the pure principal-agent model, the portion of the optimal equity of an entrepreneur offered by venture capitalist would drop with increasing of en overconfidence regardless of who are self-interested or inequity-disgusting entrepreneur s trepreneurs; entrepreneur＇s efforts would grow with his/her overconfidence rising. In the entrepreneur groups, the welfare would rise as the overconfidence of the entrepreneur grows regardless of who are elf-interested or inequity-disgusting entrepreneurs.
出处
《管理学报》
2006年第6期703-708,共6页
Chinese Journal of Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70473026)
关键词
风险投资契约
绩效
过度自信
公平
venture capital financial contract
performance
over-confidence
fairness
