摘要
企业所有权的有效性决定于企业控制权与企业剩余索取权的对应。然而,在国有企业改革过程中,控制权已逐步转移到企业经营者手中,那么这种安排还具有效率吗?本文通过一个非完全信息动态博弈模型,证明了在一定条件下,这种控制权的转移及重新构造是一种有效率的组织演化形式。
The basic view of the modern corporation theory about the corporation ownership arrangement is that the residual fights of cl.aim should match the residual rights of control.. While in the reform of state owned enterprises, the controlling right was transferred to the enterprise manager gradually. Then, is it still efficient？ Through a dynamic game model with incomplete information, this paper proves that this kind of transfer is an efficient form of organizational evolution.
出处
《财经科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第9期60-67,共8页
Finance & Economics
关键词
控制权
效率
动态博弈模型
controlling fight
efficiency
dynamic game model
