摘要
本文研究了存在大股东代理问题下的并购财富效应及其形成机理,通过理论分析发现,大股东发起的收购行为通常导致并购方及其关联企业的总利润减少,竞争对手的利润增加,消费者剩余减少。尽管收购活动对并购方而言没有创造价值,但并购事件依然发生。这是因为收购后控制性股东将偏袒他拥有现金流权相对较多的企业,而侵害其他企业小股东利益。本文的研究成果对制定收购监管规则及小股东保护制度有一定的参考意义。
The paper investigates the wealth effect of M＆A when there exist agency problems of large shareholder and its mechanism of formation, we find that M＆A initiated by large shareholder always make the overall profits of acquirer and linked firms decreaseing and the profits of rivals increasing. However, M＆A still happen. This is because： after the acquisition, the dominant shareholder will favor the firm in which he holds the relatively higher share to the detriment of shareholders of the others. The conclusion will be make the rules of M＆A and the protection of small shareholders. eventually helpful to
出处
《中国工业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第7期124-128,共5页
China Industrial Economics
