摘要
本文通过构建机构投资者与控股大股东之间的博弈模型,探讨机构投资者在第二类委托—代理问题中所发挥的作用,同时通过纯策略和混合策略纳什均衡解的分析发现:当控股大股东"掏空"行为的惩罚成本比较小时,无论机构投资者是否监督,控股大股东的占优策略都是攫取控制权私人收益,机构投资者的监督并不能有效抑制控股大股东的侵害行为;当证券监管部门对控股大股东的"掏空"行为的处罚达到一定程度时,机构投资者的监督才能有效抑制控股大股东的"掏空"行为,且随着机构投资者持股比率与持股时间的增加,这种抑制作用越来越明显。
This study proposes a game model between a institutional investor and a big controlling shareholder to study institutional investors＇ role in solving the second type agency problem. By analyzing the pure Nash equilibrium and the mixed Nash equilibrium. This study finds that：when the punishment to the＂ tunneling＂ of the big controlling shareholder is low, whenever the strategy of the institutional investor is ＂monitoring＂, the dominant strategy of the big controlling shareholder is ＂tunneling＂ ; when the cost of punishment is reached to a degree, the supervision of the institutional investor can prevent the big controlling shareholder from tunneling effectively, the higher the ratio of institutional shareholding and the longer the time the institution having been invested in the finn, the bigger the role of restraining the big controlling shareholder from tunneling.
出处
《南京财经大学学报》
2008年第5期29-31,44,共4页
Journal of Nanjing University of Finance and Economics
基金
南京财经大学校级课题(C0710)
关键词
机构投资者
掏空
博弈
Institutional Investor
Tunneling
Game
