摘要
文章从一个有待检验的假设———最高法院可能愿意维持现有的法院行政性管理制度———入手,根据实地调研来的大量法官数据,展示了中国各级法院内部频繁的行政性流动的局部场景,并运用利益逻辑和成本———收益方法论证了法官为什么流动,法院和法官为什么忽视司法知识的积累等问题。更进一步地,借用激励理论、管理学和博弈论的工具,文中还论证了司法逻辑和行政逻辑之间的迥然差异,分析了中国法院系统忽视司法制度逻辑的原因以及改变这种行政性制度安排和行政性管理逻辑的困难和艰巨性。不仅验证了假设,还指出了法官的行政性流动制度和专业司法知识积累之间的张力,揭示了中国法院高度行政化管理现实背后的深层制度性成因。
Supposing that the supreme court maybe wish to keep the administrative management system, the article reveals parts of scene of administrative flow inside the supreme court which is based on a large of data acquired by practical investigation and research. The article demonstrates such problems that why judges flow and why the accumulation of judicial acknowledge is neglected by court and judges with the method of interest logic and cost - profit. Moreover, the article also argues the difference between judicial logic and administrative logic with the encouragement theory, management science and game theory, and analysises the reason that judicial system logic is neglected by the system of China court and the difficulty and arduousness to change it. The article not only tests and verifies the hypothesis, but also points out the tension of them, and reveals the system reason of the administrative management inside the court.
出处
《法制与社会发展》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第4期95-112,共18页
Law and Social Development
关键词
司法知识
法官流动
司法逻辑
行政逻辑
judicial acknowledge
judge flow
judicial logic
administrative logic
