摘要
在委托代理关系中,企业所有者和经营者的目标函数存在差异,由此产生代理成本,需要对经营者进行相应的激励。然而,基于传统业绩评价而实施的股票期权存在一些弊端。本文探索将股票期权嫁接到EVA(经济附加值)平台之上,提出了基于EVA的经理人股票期权激励方案,以期能更有效地解决激励问题。
In the procuration relation, owners of a company usually provide for incentive schemes to the managers However, malpractice is found in the performance-based scheme. This paper tries to transfer the stock option to the EVA platform and introduces EVA-based incentive scheme in hope to provide for a workable solution
出处
《证券市场导报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第4期16-20,共5页
Securities Market Herald
关键词
激励机制
代理成本
股票期权
经济附加值
incentive scheme
agency costs, stock optioneconomic added value
