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面向信息甄别的物流外包合同设计研究 被引量:5

Logistics Outsourcing Contract Model Oriented to Info-Screening
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摘要 在面向信息甄别的物流外包合同中,提供给低能力的第三方物流服务提供者的外包合同参数中既不需包含激励因子,也不需包含惩罚因子;但提供给高能力第三方物流服务提供者的外包合同参数中至少应包含激励因子或惩罚因子,而且激励因子越高,初始支付应越低,反之,惩罚因子越高,初始支付也应越高。 In the logistics outsourcing contract oriented to info-screening, the contract parameters offered to the third-party logistics provider with low capability neither include any penalty scheme, nor an incentive scheme. However, the contract parameters offered to the third-party logistic provider with high capability include at least either a penalty scheme or an incentive scheme. Furthermore, the more attractive the incentive scheme, the less the initial remuneration and vice versa.
作者 田宇
出处 《工业工程与管理》 2005年第5期61-63,67,共4页 Industrial Engineering and Management
基金 国家自然科学基金(70302010)资助
关键词 物流 信息甄别 外包 合同 logistics screening outsourcing contract
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参考文献6

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