摘要
第三方物流提供者如何设计有效的激励机制既避免分包商的败德行为,又促使分包商不断提升服务绩效直至第三方物流的整体绩效最佳是本文的研究主题。本文通过引入Stackelberg主从对策的研究方法,首先假定分包合同决策变量为外生变量的前提下,构建合同双方博弈的Nash均衡模型,进一步在Nash均衡的约束下,从优化第三方物流的整体绩效出发,分析决策变量为内生变量时的最优解,从而把目前局限于委托代理层面的分包合同关系研究推进到了委托代理与合同整体绩效最优决策相结合的层面。
The research theme of this paper is about how third-party logistics provider design a kind of effective incentive mechanism which can not only avoid the moral hazard behavior of the subcontractor, but also promote subcontractor to raise the serving performance constantly, until obtaining the best TPL performance. This paper through building Staekelberg game model where constructing the Nash equilibrium model assuming subcontract decision variable as endogenetic variable tints： and then analysis the optimal solution with the restraint of Nash equilibrium at the time of decision variable as exogenous variable, pushes the subcontract relationship research at the principal-agent level into the lay that principal-agent combining with whole contract performance optimal decision.
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
2005年第4期100-103,共4页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70302010)
