Consider a fashion supply chain comprising a supplier, a contract manufacturer and a fashion brand, we examine the fashion brand＇s profit performances when the contract manufacturer is either an OEM （having no desig...Consider a fashion supply chain comprising a supplier, a contract manufacturer and a fashion brand, we examine the fashion brand＇s profit performances when the contract manufacturer is either an OEM （having no design capability） or an ODM （having design capability）. Regarding OEM, the fashion brand designs the products, outsources the manufacturing function, and has the option of outsourcing procurement function. Regarding ODM, the fashion brand buys unlabeled products from the ODM, which is charge of designing and manufacturing. In this case, buy-back contract is widely adopted so as to share the risk of demand uncertainty between the ODM and the fashion brand. We solve the wholesale pricing problems via sequential/simultaneous optimization, and derive the buy-back price via generalize Nash bargaining. We find that, fashion brand prefers contracting with an ODM when its bargaining power in buy-back negotiation is larger than a threshold, although the fashion brand＇s order size under ODM is always larger than that under OEM. Interestingly, we find that the buy-back price is decreasing in the fashion brand＇s bargaining power. We further analyze the supply chain sustainability in both ODM and OEM scenarios, fmding that the supply chain might achieve both environmental sustainability and economic sustainability in OEM scenario when the fashion brand＇s bargaining power in buy-back negotiation is small.展开更多
This paper investigates an optimal decision problem in a single-period, two-stage supply chain with capacity reservation contract. At the beginning of the planning horizon, the retailer, who faces stochastic demand, r...This paper investigates an optimal decision problem in a single-period, two-stage supply chain with capacity reservation contract. At the beginning of the planning horizon, the retailer, who faces stochastic demand, reserves future capacity according to his forecasting of the demand. The supplier then constructs capacity. At the beginning of the selling season, the retailer updates the demand forecasting and places an order. When the retailer＇s demand is greater than the supplier＇s capacity, the supplier can meet the retailer＇s demand by outsourcing. We analyze the optimal decision of each player in both centralized and decentralized systems. Furthermore, under the case in which demand follows a uniform distribution, we obtain the closed-form optimal strategies of each player for both centralized and decentralized systems and conduct numerical studies to reveal additional conclusions. The numerical studies show that the optimal reservation capacity for the retailer and the optimal constructing capacity for the supplier in the decentralized system are both less than the optimal constructing capacity in the centralized system. Furthermore, we also find that the profit loss due to decentralization always exists and increases in indeterminacy.展开更多
The definition of relational contents which outsourcer and outsourcee arrange and formalize inside a contract is one of the critical success factors of the outsourcing choice. The contract criticality is greater if th...The definition of relational contents which outsourcer and outsourcee arrange and formalize inside a contract is one of the critical success factors of the outsourcing choice. The contract criticality is greater if the outsourcing aim is made of highly strategic activities, functions, or processes and if the real aim is not the cost saving but the sharing of added value resources, skills, and knowledge. That is, this paper aims to provide some conceptual insights about the role of the contract with a specific reference to the strategic outsourcing, which is the kind of outsourcing where the relationship between the outsourcer and outsourcee is set inside the ＂partnership-based＂ logic. In particular the remarks proposed concern the role of the contract as a tool to face the risk and manage the relationship.展开更多
文摘Consider a fashion supply chain comprising a supplier, a contract manufacturer and a fashion brand, we examine the fashion brand＇s profit performances when the contract manufacturer is either an OEM （having no design capability） or an ODM （having design capability）. Regarding OEM, the fashion brand designs the products, outsources the manufacturing function, and has the option of outsourcing procurement function. Regarding ODM, the fashion brand buys unlabeled products from the ODM, which is charge of designing and manufacturing. In this case, buy-back contract is widely adopted so as to share the risk of demand uncertainty between the ODM and the fashion brand. We solve the wholesale pricing problems via sequential/simultaneous optimization, and derive the buy-back price via generalize Nash bargaining. We find that, fashion brand prefers contracting with an ODM when its bargaining power in buy-back negotiation is larger than a threshold, although the fashion brand＇s order size under ODM is always larger than that under OEM. Interestingly, we find that the buy-back price is decreasing in the fashion brand＇s bargaining power. We further analyze the supply chain sustainability in both ODM and OEM scenarios, fmding that the supply chain might achieve both environmental sustainability and economic sustainability in OEM scenario when the fashion brand＇s bargaining power in buy-back negotiation is small.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(71171088,71072118,70901029,71171027,71131004)NCET-12-0081the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities,HUST:CXY12M013
文摘This paper investigates an optimal decision problem in a single-period, two-stage supply chain with capacity reservation contract. At the beginning of the planning horizon, the retailer, who faces stochastic demand, reserves future capacity according to his forecasting of the demand. The supplier then constructs capacity. At the beginning of the selling season, the retailer updates the demand forecasting and places an order. When the retailer＇s demand is greater than the supplier＇s capacity, the supplier can meet the retailer＇s demand by outsourcing. We analyze the optimal decision of each player in both centralized and decentralized systems. Furthermore, under the case in which demand follows a uniform distribution, we obtain the closed-form optimal strategies of each player for both centralized and decentralized systems and conduct numerical studies to reveal additional conclusions. The numerical studies show that the optimal reservation capacity for the retailer and the optimal constructing capacity for the supplier in the decentralized system are both less than the optimal constructing capacity in the centralized system. Furthermore, we also find that the profit loss due to decentralization always exists and increases in indeterminacy.
文摘The definition of relational contents which outsourcer and outsourcee arrange and formalize inside a contract is one of the critical success factors of the outsourcing choice. The contract criticality is greater if the outsourcing aim is made of highly strategic activities, functions, or processes and if the real aim is not the cost saving but the sharing of added value resources, skills, and knowledge. That is, this paper aims to provide some conceptual insights about the role of the contract with a specific reference to the strategic outsourcing, which is the kind of outsourcing where the relationship between the outsourcer and outsourcee is set inside the ＂partnership-based＂ logic. In particular the remarks proposed concern the role of the contract as a tool to face the risk and manage the relationship.
