摘要
针对IT外包的需求不确定性和投资不可逆性,考虑了两类合同:成本加成合同和固定价格合同,运用实物期权理论构建了外包时机的分析框架。研究结果表明:对于低技术业务,无论是采用成本加成合同还是固定价格合同,随着不确定性的增加,外包概率降低、等待时间增加;对于高技术业务,随着不确定性的增加,固定价格合同下外包概率降低、等待时间增加,而成本加成合同下的结果则相反(外包概率提高、等待时间减少),较高的不确定性有利于外包。无论是成本加成合同还是固定价格合同,内制固定成本越高、外包固定成本和转换成本越低,越有利于外包。对于低技术业务,无论是采用成本加成合同还是固定价格合同,可变成本越高,越有利于外包;对于高技术业务,固定价格合同下可变成本较高有利于外包,但成本加成合同下则相反。成本加成合同下服务商的成本优势有利于外包,固定价格合同下服务商的成本优势对外包时机没有影响。
The proliferation of outsourcing facilitates the clients to access to technological expertise and cost efficiency of the service venders.However,purposes of outsourcing are not always met.Firstly,the investment of outsourcing is irreversible.When the clients select outsourcing,there will be a payment for service vendors via contracting and a considerable management cost due to supervising outsourcing process.Moreover,there will be a switching cost as a result of switching form insourcing to outsourcing.Once the outsourcing fails,these expenses will not be able to recovered.Secondly,the service requirements are changing and uncertain resulting from the turbulent information technology environments and business change,increasing the difficulty of outsourcing relationship management and the probability of outsourcing failure.The aforementioned considerations motivate the clients to reserve the outsourcing flexibility.Specifically,the clients can exercise outsourcing immediately when the environment is favorable or choose insourcing when facing unfavorable conditions or postpone outsourcing until the conditions become favorable,that is,the clients owns the outsourcing option.In addition,contracts are pivotal tools to manage outsourcing operations,in which the incentive and flexibility associated with outsourcing timing is different.For instance,fixed-price contract can incentive the service vendors to reduce costs through process innovation but lacks flexibility,while cost-plus contract has no incentive for the service vendors to cut cost but has high flexibility.Uncertainty may make it necessary for the clients to have more flexibility in an outsourcing.However,the lack of incentive in the contract may bring opposite influence.Considering the risks of demand uncertainty and irreversible investment of IT outsourcing,an analytical framework with real options theory is developed to address issues of outsourcing timing.The results show that for low-skill process the probability of outsourcing is decreasing in volatility
作者
张宗明
柴建
廖貅武
Zhang Zongming;Chai Jian;Liao Xiuwu(School of Economics and Management,Xidian University,Xi'an 710126,China;School of Management,Xi'an Jiaotong University,Xi'an 710049,China)
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2024年第8期182-193,共12页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71502132,71771184)
中国博士后科学基金面上项目(2018M631126)
陕西省博士后科研项目(30102200010)。
关键词
IT外包
合同类型
外包时机
实物期权理论
IT outsourcing
contract type
outsourcing timing
real options theory
