Based on game theory and principal-agent theory, this paper focuses on how to control product quality and design quality contract in supply chain when moral hazard exists. We set up the supplier and buyer＇s expected ...Based on game theory and principal-agent theory, this paper focuses on how to control product quality and design quality contract in supply chain when moral hazard exists. We set up the supplier and buyer＇s expected profits function model, in which the supplier makes production process investment-level decision and decides on the product quality prevention level, whereas the buyer makes quality evaluation decision and decides on the product quality inspection level. The supplier with a moral hazard of reducing investment level may lack investment in the production process; thus, the buyer will pay the information rent to incentivize the supplier to improve the investment level. The buyer creates the moral hazard of exaggerating the product quality defective rate, who may overinvest in the inspection process. We use the optimal condition to solve supplier＇s first-best investment level, product quality prevention level, and buyer＇s first-best quality inspection level, internal penalty, and apportionment ratio of external failure cost. We also conduct a simulation test that shows the following： When the supplier improves its investment level, its product quality prevention level will increase, and the buyer＇s quality inspection level will decrease. With the improvement in the buyer＇s product quality inspection level, its internal penalty will increase, and the supplier＇s external failure cost will also increase while its expected profits will decrease. Hence, the buyer will design an incentive contract, the expected profits of which will increase, and the whole supply chain＇s joint expected profits function may become an inverse U shape. Finally, we develop a simulation example and propose suggestions for quality control strategy and contract design in the supply chain under the conditions of asymmetric information.展开更多
研究易损耗物品质押融资中金融机构与第三方物流服务供应商(Third Party Logistics Service Provider,3PLs)的合约设计问题。在存货被质押期间,3PLs的监管付出程度会对金融机构的期望收益产生影响。因此,金融机构应赋予3PLs一份激励合约...研究易损耗物品质押融资中金融机构与第三方物流服务供应商(Third Party Logistics Service Provider,3PLs)的合约设计问题。在存货被质押期间,3PLs的监管付出程度会对金融机构的期望收益产生影响。因此,金融机构应赋予3PLs一份激励合约,以刺激3PLs提高监管努力水平。考虑存货在质押期间发生损耗的基础上,建立金融机构与3PLs进行合作的期望收益函数,分析金融机构与3PLs采用委托监管、共同经营及统一授信等模式时的固定支付与激励系数特征,推导每种模式下3PLs的最优监管努力水平。通过数值算例对三种模式下的期望收益水平进行比较,并考察损耗率、努力成本系数和价值变现系数变动对决策变量的影响。结果表明:价值变现系数存在一个临界值,当价值变现系数小于该临界值时,统一授信模式的总期望收益最大;而当价值变现系数大于该临界值时,委托监管模式的总期望收益最大。展开更多
针对出行即服务(Mobility as a Service,MaaS)提供定制化的出行服务以满足游客差异化的交通需求,构建了由传统旅游供应商和MaaS平台组成的双渠道旅游出行服务链,探讨不同主导权下的集中式决策和分散式决策策略及其效益,并开展以供应商...针对出行即服务(Mobility as a Service,MaaS)提供定制化的出行服务以满足游客差异化的交通需求,构建了由传统旅游供应商和MaaS平台组成的双渠道旅游出行服务链,探讨不同主导权下的集中式决策和分散式决策策略及其效益,并开展以供应商为主导的供应链收益共享契约设计和数值分析。研究结果发现:基于MaaS的旅游供应链集中式决策下的效益大于分散式决策,且集中式决策效益是以供应商为主导的分散式决策效益的3/4。在收益共享契约协调下,供应商利润和MaaS平台利润分别为0.68和0.58,均有所提高,旅游供应链整体效益最大,实现旅游供应链完美协调。展开更多
基金supported in part by the National Nature Science Foundation of China under grant No. 70832005Shanghai Leading Academic Discipline Project under Contract No. B310
文摘Based on game theory and principal-agent theory, this paper focuses on how to control product quality and design quality contract in supply chain when moral hazard exists. We set up the supplier and buyer＇s expected profits function model, in which the supplier makes production process investment-level decision and decides on the product quality prevention level, whereas the buyer makes quality evaluation decision and decides on the product quality inspection level. The supplier with a moral hazard of reducing investment level may lack investment in the production process; thus, the buyer will pay the information rent to incentivize the supplier to improve the investment level. The buyer creates the moral hazard of exaggerating the product quality defective rate, who may overinvest in the inspection process. We use the optimal condition to solve supplier＇s first-best investment level, product quality prevention level, and buyer＇s first-best quality inspection level, internal penalty, and apportionment ratio of external failure cost. We also conduct a simulation test that shows the following： When the supplier improves its investment level, its product quality prevention level will increase, and the buyer＇s quality inspection level will decrease. With the improvement in the buyer＇s product quality inspection level, its internal penalty will increase, and the supplier＇s external failure cost will also increase while its expected profits will decrease. Hence, the buyer will design an incentive contract, the expected profits of which will increase, and the whole supply chain＇s joint expected profits function may become an inverse U shape. Finally, we develop a simulation example and propose suggestions for quality control strategy and contract design in the supply chain under the conditions of asymmetric information.
文摘研究易损耗物品质押融资中金融机构与第三方物流服务供应商(Third Party Logistics Service Provider,3PLs)的合约设计问题。在存货被质押期间,3PLs的监管付出程度会对金融机构的期望收益产生影响。因此,金融机构应赋予3PLs一份激励合约,以刺激3PLs提高监管努力水平。考虑存货在质押期间发生损耗的基础上,建立金融机构与3PLs进行合作的期望收益函数,分析金融机构与3PLs采用委托监管、共同经营及统一授信等模式时的固定支付与激励系数特征,推导每种模式下3PLs的最优监管努力水平。通过数值算例对三种模式下的期望收益水平进行比较,并考察损耗率、努力成本系数和价值变现系数变动对决策变量的影响。结果表明:价值变现系数存在一个临界值,当价值变现系数小于该临界值时,统一授信模式的总期望收益最大;而当价值变现系数大于该临界值时,委托监管模式的总期望收益最大。
文摘针对出行即服务(Mobility as a Service,MaaS)提供定制化的出行服务以满足游客差异化的交通需求,构建了由传统旅游供应商和MaaS平台组成的双渠道旅游出行服务链,探讨不同主导权下的集中式决策和分散式决策策略及其效益,并开展以供应商为主导的供应链收益共享契约设计和数值分析。研究结果发现:基于MaaS的旅游供应链集中式决策下的效益大于分散式决策,且集中式决策效益是以供应商为主导的分散式决策效益的3/4。在收益共享契约协调下,供应商利润和MaaS平台利润分别为0.68和0.58,均有所提高,旅游供应链整体效益最大,实现旅游供应链完美协调。
