摘要
针对一个道德风险和逆向选择并存的逆向供应链系统,利用博弈论和激励理论,分别研究了对称信息和不对称信息下政府和制造商线性契约设计过程,分析了各激励因素对契约的影响,并通过数值仿真探讨了各参数变化对政府、制造商和回收商期望收益的影响.研究表明:委托方设计合理的激励契约能有效甄别代理方的信息,促进企业努力水平,提高政府和企业的期望收益.
For a reverse supply chain （RSC）system with both moral hazard and adverse selection, the design of the government and the manufacturer＇s linear contracts is studied under both symmetric information and asymmetric information. The influence of various incentive factors on the contracts are analyzed as well. The impact on the expected profits of the government, manufacturer, recycler of various parameters are discussed by a numerical simulation. The results indicate that the proposed contract designed by the principal can effec- tively identify the information of the agent, promote enterprises＇ effort level, and improve the government and enterprises＇ expected revenues.
出处
《系统工程学报》
CSCD
北大核心
2015年第6期821-835,共15页
Journal of Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172182
71371169)
国家留学基金资助项目(201208330004)
浙江省自然科学基金资助项目(LY14G020005)
浙江省哲学社会科学规划课题资助项目(14NDJC167YB)
关键词
逆向供应链
道德风险
逆向选择
激励机制
契约设计
reverse supply chain
moral hazard
adverse selection
incentive mechanism
contract design
