This paper explores the positive governance effects of the Procuratorate’s Public Interest Litigation System in China,which combines the powers of litigationand administrative supervision,on the quality of informatio...This paper explores the positive governance effects of the Procuratorate’s Public Interest Litigation System in China,which combines the powers of litigationand administrative supervision,on the quality of information disclosure bylisted state-owned enterprises.We report several findings.(1)The likelihoodthat listed state-owned enterprises would issue financial restatements and participate in financial fraud decreased significantly in areas selected for pilotimplementation.(2)The governance effect is stronger in regulated industriesthan in unregulated industries.After the pilot implementation,the agencycosts decreased,and the increase in legal litigation risks related to false statements faced by enterprises played a deterrent effect.(3)The significance of theabove results is stronger when a company’s external and internal governanceare weaker.This study provides both new evidence of the effectiveness of theintegrated governance mechanism and inspiration for future efforts to widelyimplement this mechanism in the capital market.展开更多
基金We appreciate the comments from seminar participants at the Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu-Fudan Accounting Forum(2022).We are also grateful for the helpful comments and suggestions from Zhifeng Tong.The authors acknowledge financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China(grant numbers:72272132,71872048)the Natural Science Foundation of Guangdong Province(grant number:2024A1515011061)the Funding by Science and Technology Projects in Guangzhou(project number:2024A04J3765).Professional English language editing support provided by AsiaEdit(asiaedit.com).
文摘This paper explores the positive governance effects of the Procuratorate’s Public Interest Litigation System in China,which combines the powers of litigationand administrative supervision,on the quality of information disclosure bylisted state-owned enterprises.We report several findings.(1)The likelihoodthat listed state-owned enterprises would issue financial restatements and participate in financial fraud decreased significantly in areas selected for pilotimplementation.(2)The governance effect is stronger in regulated industriesthan in unregulated industries.After the pilot implementation,the agencycosts decreased,and the increase in legal litigation risks related to false statements faced by enterprises played a deterrent effect.(3)The significance of theabove results is stronger when a company’s external and internal governanceare weaker.This study provides both new evidence of the effectiveness of theintegrated governance mechanism and inspiration for future efforts to widelyimplement this mechanism in the capital market.
