In China, the responsibilitY of protecting the environment lies largely with local governments. Within the framework of spatial econometrics, we investigate empirically the consequence of such an institutional setting...In China, the responsibilitY of protecting the environment lies largely with local governments. Within the framework of spatial econometrics, we investigate empirically the consequence of such an institutional setting. Using city-level data for China, the present study finds that city governments behave strategically in making spending decisions regarding environmental protection. This paper finds that a city government appears to cut its own spending as a response to the rise in environmental protection spending by its neighbors. Hence, environmental protection tends to be underprovided. As a result, we suggest that centralizing the environmental protection responsibility to a higher level of government would be beneficial in terms of controlling pollution in China.展开更多
根据是否存在策略互动,本文构建了两类不同决策机制的土地价格竞争模型(策略版和竞次版)来分析地市级地方政府工业用地定价策略。文章随后采用2003-2006年地市级土地出让价格等数据构建空间面板数据模型并估计了工业用地价格反应方程。...根据是否存在策略互动,本文构建了两类不同决策机制的土地价格竞争模型(策略版和竞次版)来分析地市级地方政府工业用地定价策略。文章随后采用2003-2006年地市级土地出让价格等数据构建空间面板数据模型并估计了工业用地价格反应方程。实证研究结果支持竞次版理论模型的预测,即地市级政府间的工业用地价格竞争不存在明显的策略互动。我们发现片面追求经济增长的地方政府在地区博弈中存在一个"竞次到底"(race to the bottom)的占优策略,可以解释当前地方政府低价甚至亏本出让工业用地的普遍作法。尽管这一占优策略带来了社会福利的损失,但是每个地方政府都没有激励去改变策略,从而导致工业地价长期保持在较低水平上。本文的发现丰富了学界关于地方政府工业土地定价策略决策特征的认识,也为未来土地政策的取向提供了一定的参考依据。展开更多
基金supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universitiesthe Research Funds of Renmin University of China (11XNL009)
文摘In China, the responsibilitY of protecting the environment lies largely with local governments. Within the framework of spatial econometrics, we investigate empirically the consequence of such an institutional setting. Using city-level data for China, the present study finds that city governments behave strategically in making spending decisions regarding environmental protection. This paper finds that a city government appears to cut its own spending as a response to the rise in environmental protection spending by its neighbors. Hence, environmental protection tends to be underprovided. As a result, we suggest that centralizing the environmental protection responsibility to a higher level of government would be beneficial in terms of controlling pollution in China.
文摘根据是否存在策略互动,本文构建了两类不同决策机制的土地价格竞争模型(策略版和竞次版)来分析地市级地方政府工业用地定价策略。文章随后采用2003-2006年地市级土地出让价格等数据构建空间面板数据模型并估计了工业用地价格反应方程。实证研究结果支持竞次版理论模型的预测,即地市级政府间的工业用地价格竞争不存在明显的策略互动。我们发现片面追求经济增长的地方政府在地区博弈中存在一个"竞次到底"(race to the bottom)的占优策略,可以解释当前地方政府低价甚至亏本出让工业用地的普遍作法。尽管这一占优策略带来了社会福利的损失,但是每个地方政府都没有激励去改变策略,从而导致工业地价长期保持在较低水平上。本文的发现丰富了学界关于地方政府工业土地定价策略决策特征的认识,也为未来土地政策的取向提供了一定的参考依据。
