摘要
研究目的:以中国273个城市为研究对象,探究地方政府土地资源配置策略互动的存在性及其激励机制,并进一步识别策略互动所呈现出的具体形态。研究方法:“自上而下”的标尺竞争模型、空间自回归模型以及非对称反应模型。研究结果:(1)地方政府在土地资源配置决策上存在显著的模仿式策略互动行为,且这种趋同性会随着“距离”增加而逐步衰减;(2)机制检验表明,地方政府土地资源配置策略互动源于“自上而下”的标尺竞争机制,具体而言,引资竞争和财税竞争分别是城市间在工业用地价格和商住用地价格决策上竞相模仿的激励来源;(3)策略互动非对称性检验表明,城市间差别化土地资源配置互动形态截然不同,其中,工业用地价格呈现“逐底竞争”特征,而商住用地价格则呈现“逐顶竞争”特征。研究结论:应深化财税体制改革,构建与经济高质量发展相适宜的多维政绩考核体系,从源头上遏制地方政府在土地资源配置上的恶性竞争;应完善土地交易机制,探索城市间土地资源配置的协调机制,驱使土地资源配置由竞争走向竞合。
The purposes of this paper are to explore the existence and incentive mechanism of strategy interaction of land resource allocation among local governments and to further identify the specific forms of strategic interaction based on 273 cities in China.The research methods include yardstick competition“from top to bottom”model,spatial autoregressive model and asymmetric response model.The results show that there exists significant imitation strategy interaction in land resource allocation decision-making among local governments,and this convergence will gradually decay with the increase of“distance”.The results of mechanism tests show that,strategic interaction of land resource allocation among local governments stems from the yardstick competition“from top to bottom”.Specifically,the competition of attracting investment and finance and taxation are the incentives for cities to imitate each other of industrial land price and commercial and residential land price,respectively.The asymmetry test of strategic interaction shows that the interactive forms of differentiated land resource allocation among cities are quite different.Concretely,industrial land price presents the characteristics of“race to the bottom”,while commercial and residential land price presents the characteristics of“race to the top”.In conclusion,the central government should deepen the reform of fiscal and taxation system,and build a multi-dimensional political performance evaluation system suitable for high-quality economic development,to curb the vicious competition in land resources allocation among local governments.Moreover,the land transaction mechanism should be improved and the coordination mechanism among cities should be explored,to drive land resource allocation moving from competition to cooperation.
作者
安勇
AN Yong(Faculty of Finance,Shanxi University of Finance and Economics,Taiyuan 030006,China)
出处
《中国土地科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2022年第3期13-21,共9页
China Land Science
基金
国家社会科学基金资助项目(20BJY068)
山西省哲学社会科学项目(2019B141)。
关键词
土地经济
土地资源配置
非对称反应模型
策略互动
land economy
land resource allocation
asymmetric response model
strategic interaction
