摘要
笔者基于2003年~2012年全国31个省区市的面板数据,采用系统广义矩估计方法对我国地方政府间环境支出的策略性行为进行了识别,通过设定地理相邻和经济相似两类空间权重矩阵,对地方政府间环境支出的策略互动行为形成机制进行了检验。实证研究表明:地方政府间环境支出存在显著的竞争效应,但没有发现溢出效应的证据。研究还发现我国的财政分权显著地挤出了地方政府的环境支出。
This paper focuses on the Chinese fiscal decentralization competition and local governments＇ environmental expenditure aiming to figure out their strategic interaction model and formation mechanism, using spatial econometric analysis based on the provincial panel data from 2003 to 2012 in China. Empirical results are as follows： firstly, the behavior of local governments＇ environmental expenditure has significantly strategic interaction ; secondly, the behavior of local governments＇ environmental expenditure produces significant competition effect, but the spillover effect is not significant; thirdly, Chinese fiscal decentralization is significantly out of the local government＇s environmental expenditure.
出处
《经济经纬》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第1期130-135,共6页
Economic Survey
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(12XJC790008)
云南省应用基础研究项目(2011FZ085
2012FB145)
关键词
分权竞争
策略互动
环境支出
Decentralization Competition
Strategic Interaction
Environmental Expenditure
